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Approaches to pre-modern war and ethics: some comparative and multi-disciplinary 
perspectives 
  
 
War is both violent and significantly ordered. As an intrinsically social phenomenon, war is 
deeply affected by all manner of socio-cultural norms and ‘ethics’ that shape the 
conceptualisation and experience of war, from justifying it to condemning it, from 
formulating grand strategy to engaging in individual hand-to-hand combat, and from 
understanding what it means to achieve victory or suffer defeat. 
How should we approach the study of war and the ethics of war, particularly from the 
perspective of intellectual history? When scholars still lack a consensus definition of what 
war is, much less a consensus about how war has shaped and been shaped by ethical thought, 
this is far from an easy question. I do not even dare to open this question up to ‘violence’ 
more generally, which expands the conceptual and definitional obstacles almost 
exponentially.1 The problem of definition is exacerbated when thinking across cultures as 
well as large expanses of time, for a definition that may appear suitable to describe ancient 
Near Eastern warfare may be inadequate to cope with sixteenth-century European warfare. A 
satisfactory universal definition becomes yet more elusive when thinking across disciplines, 
for the embedded interests of various disciplinary approaches will inevitably stress numerous 
differing elements that constitute the complex phenomenon of war, therefore generating 
contrasting definitions of what ‘war’ is. 
For the purposes of this essay, I take war to refer to organised armed conflict between 
distinct and exogenously or endogenously recognised groups. This definition is broad enough 
to encompass most disciplinary interests in war and can also include civil wars, which are 
fought between competing groups who claim at least some degree of distinction and usually 
achieve some degree of exogenous or endogenous recognition. The definition is also narrow 
enough to preclude elements such as psychological, propaganda, or – in a contemporary 
context – cyber ‘warfare’ as independently meriting the identification of ‘war’. According to 
my definition, a propaganda campaign alone is not sufficient to be defined as war. However, 
it fully admits that such aspects of hostility are very often integrated into wider armed 
conflict. Furthermore, while psychological and propaganda ‘warfare’ can certainly be 
detected in wars prior to the early-modern period (for instance, the terror tactics of Egyptian 
and Assyrian kings or the military advice of Sun Tzu), their development was quite 
rudimentary and their deployment limited. 
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I do not claim to offer here anything like a methodological manifesto; rather, I simply 
offer some reflections on how different methodological approaches can inform a historical 
analysis of war and ethics. While I do not offer a concrete manifesto, I do admit to a personal 
scholarly conviction: a belief in the value of comparison. More contentiously, for any 
historian of a strictly historicist bent, I believe that a better understanding of pre-modern 
approaches to the ethics of war might teach us something about how we should think about 
the ethics of war today. Typically, we understand the historian as interested in empirical 
particulars, as opposed to the theorist, interested in abstractions and generalizations. Even 
without offering any value judgement, I think it is easy to exaggerate the distance between a 
historical interest in particulars and a theoretical interest in generalizations.2 I see no great 
distance separating them; I see no reason why the one cannot inform the other and vice-versa. 
History – however particular – undoubtedly has value for its own sake. But this conviction 
need not exclude the possibility that history may have different (not necessarily greater or 
lesser) value when incorporated into more generalizing explanations and theories, especially 
if those theories can help us to navigate the many challenges of our own contemporary world. 
It seems to me that no great mental effort is required to distinguish between an ambition to 
understand history wie es eigentlich gewesen, on the one hand, and a desire to employ 
historical evidence as something which might be deployed more generally, or provide 
guidance to contemporary challenges. The project of post-modernism has already shown us 
that the type of positivist objectivity envisioned by the likes of Ranke or Simiand is 
impossible.3 We simply need to have some self-awareness of where we are placing ourselves 
along the spectrum of relativism: are we striving for objectivity and contextual exactitude 
(knowing that we will never quite reach it), or are we willing to sacrifice a measure of 
contextual exactitude in order to service more generalizing and probably more presentist 
interests? As long as the scholar is honest with herself, and her reader, as to where along the 
spectrum she is residing when making any particular claim, then I see no great problem. 
Moreover, I believe it to be possible to occupy more than one position in a single study: using 
closely contextualised case studies, for example, but later drawing out the particulars of these 
case studies into more generalising theories. 
Indeed, over the past five decades, much of the research on the history of the ethics of 
war, especially the Western just war tradition, has been completed by scholars with a 
pronounced interest in normative thought. While a historical interest and approach clearly 
informs their work, such scholars have frequently hailed not from history faculties but from 
faculties of religious studies or philosophy. Some philosophers – most notably Michael 
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Walzer and Anthony Coates – have adopted a ‘cherry-picking’ approach to historical 
examples as a way to ground their normative assertions.4 Other ethicists have embarked on a 
far more rigorous analysis of developments in historical thought.5 More recently, the torch 
has predominantly been passed to scholars ensconced within the broad field of International 
Relations, whose engagement with normative theory in the realm of military ethics is 
nonetheless informed by an increasingly sophisticated historical awareness.6 
 
The value of comparison 
What do I mean by comparison, or rather, a comparative methodology? Within the realm of 
comparative history, Marc Bloch put it thus: 
 
Without any doubt it means this: he [the historian] selects two or more phenomena 
which appear at first sight to be analogous and which occur in one or more social 
milieus. He finds out how these phenomena resemble or differ from one another, traces 
their evolution, and, as far as possible, explains the similarities and differences.7 
 
In the early twentieth century, Bloch considered the ‘perfection and general use’ of the 
comparative method as ‘one of the most pressing needs of present-day historical science.’8 In 
asserting this claim, Bloch was reacting to a professional discipline that was becoming ever 
more specialized and narrowly focused, both in terms of chronological range and 
geographical focus. Some historians have perhaps been more inclined towards this tendency 
than others. Scholars of the American Civil War, for example, unabashedly carry the torch of 
hyper-specialization, generating monographs such as: Pickett’s Charge: A Microhistory of 
the Final Attack at Gettysburg; or Gettysburg: The Second Day.9 In contrast, historians of the 
European early middle ages, for example, have often been required to look at broad 
chronologies or expansive geographies simply as a matter of necessity: the source base, or 
rather lack of it, not permitting a microscopic focus on one day, one year, one decade, or 
sometimes even one century. 
I maintain that a willingness to look at historical subjects comparatively is 
intrinsically a good thing. Without a comparative perspective it becomes much harder to 
appreciate fully the uniqueness or generality of phenomena, or to judge their importance, in 
relative or absolute terms. 
Bloch stipulated that the comparative method required two conditions: ‘a certain 
similarity or analogy between observed phenomena…and a certain dissimilarity between the 
 4 
environments in which they occur.’10 War seems particularly well suited to such a 
comparative project. It is observable in almost every known human society and environment, 
from very early nomadic or pastoralist societies to highly industrialised and technologically 
advanced modern societies. Yet the core phenomena remain consistent – that is, people 
deliberately wound and kill one another and destroy property in order to achieve their ends, 
whatever they may be. Nonetheless, Bloch’s stipulations for comparative methodology seems 
overly restrictive. Most obviously, a comparison of similar environments that produce 
different phenomena seems equally as valid as Bloch’s model of similar phenomena 
produced in different environments. Bloch also preferred comparison between societies that 
were historical contemporaries and geographically proximate, believing that such comparison 
was ‘more precise’ than the typically ‘hypothetical conclusions’ generated by the ‘grand 
manner’ of comparing ‘societies far removed from one another in time or space’.11 However, 
Bloch provides no convincing argument for his preference for comparing geographically and 
chronologically proximate societies. As Sewell observes, ‘[m]ere temporal and spatial 
proximity…does not assure similarity, and some societies which are very remote from one 
another are surely more alike, at least in ways that are crucial for some explanatory problems, 
than some neighbouring societies’.12 
The real question is whether we are utilising ‘appropriate units of comparison’. Are 
we comparing like with like, or are we wilfully misinterpreting the phenomena of one society 
in order to mould them into something they are not – something that would be unrecognisable 
to the members of that society? Likewise, are we really tracing the development of similar 
phenomena across societies through lines of influence and transmission, or are we simply 
discovering parallel but unrelated developments? In something so universal as war, this 
concern is especially pertinent. War is evident in almost every society, regardless of time or 
space. The odds are favourable that certain phenomena linked to war have occurred, or will 
occur, in more than one society; we must be cautious before we assign historical relationships 
between such phenomena, whose existence in more than one society may be purely 
accidental, and whose creation may be a result of very different assumptions and processes. 
Nevertheless, the existence of very similar social norms and practices in multiple 
societies with no established lines of communication is a significant insight in itself, for it 
might hint at general causes. In the realm of the ethics of war, such insights are particularly 
interesting. If it can be established that societies develop similar ethical responses to the 
similar existential threats and remarkable opportunities created by war, then perhaps we will 
come as close as we are ever likely to come to a genuine insight about human nature, if such 
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a thing exists. For, as Freud observes, war is such an extreme activity that it ‘strips us of the 
later accretions of civilization, and lays bare the primal man in each of us.’13 
Notwithstanding his enthusiasm for comparative history, Bloch believed that 
comparison was most useful for highlighting the idiosyncrasies and fundamental uniqueness 
of individual societies, not for highlighting their similarities.14 For Bloch, relativism rather 
than universalism was at the heart of the comparative approach – a stance also championed 
by Clifford Geertz, who has eschewed anthropological claims to discover a consensus 
gentium (universal human customs) and instead lauds the values of cultural oddities.15 The 
capacity of a comparative approach to broaden the historian’s horizons is also noted by Chris 
Wickham, who views comparison as essential to avoiding cultural solipsism: ‘if you don’t 
compare, you end up believing that one type of historical development is normal, normative, 
and that every other is a deviation’.16 Wickham makes the astute observation that scholars 
who do not engage in comparative study typically study their own country, which frequently 
leads to insularity and further engrains national teleologies.  Indeed, comparison may be 
inherently threatening to entrenched social values, for in comparing one pattern of morals and 
customs to another, groups may open themselves up to the possibility that ‘their own morals 
and customs may not be right, sacred, or universal – as they are generally held to be’;17 
consequently, such ‘threats’ are either stigmatised, trivialized, or alienated. Arguably, 
scholars of war and violence might consider it a duty to embrace this threatening 
methodology and employ it to challenge prevailing social norms or social apathy concerning 
something as terrible as war. 
The utility of studying war and ethics over the longue durée, between multiple 
cultures and different geographical areas, lies in an assumption that such a project can 
highlight not just the differences between these societies, but also perhaps their similarities. It 
may shed light how different societies approached the problem of war in very similar ways, 
and how certain strains of ethical and legal thought were adopted and adapted between these 
societies as a result of their cultural, political, and military interaction. Of course, these are 
contentious claims in and of themselves. According to Bloch, positing that different societies 
reached similar approaches or solutions to the problems they encountered suggests the 
existence of ‘the fundamental unity of the human spirit or, if you wish, the monotony and 
astonishing poverty of human intellectual resources during the course of history.’18  
I am not convinced of this. The adoption and adaptation of ideas across time and 
cultures need not imply a single human ‘nature’, nor a poverty of human intellectual 
resources. One can just as easily argue that it simply demonstrates that, as social animals, 
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humans recurrently encounter certain facets of social life that are fundamentally important 
yet challenging at the same time. The expression and practice of concepts such as justice, 
security, love, friendship, order, and trust (the list could go on) recur in differing but 
analogous forms in almost every society. Arguably, this is because the norms and behaviour 
associated with such concepts are crucial for successful communal living, especially as 
communities become larger and more complex. If one accepts that human societies are faced 
with a series of challenges that are directly comparable across space and time – how to secure 
resources, how to guarantee a sufficient degree of internal order, how to maintain external 
security – then it should come as little surprise that societies have, at least occasionally, 
created similar solutions.19 Nor should it be surprising that successful solutions and practices 
have been borrowed across societies, whether as a consequence of direct interaction as a 
result of economic trade, political relations, or military conquest, or indirect interaction, such 
as through inherited customs, laws, religion, or even through historical study of the past. As 
Sorabji and Rodin note, ‘different traditions are not hermetically sealed from each other’.20 
Indeed, it is through comparison that we are best able to detect influences and even 
continuities across socio-cultural borders.21 
The issue of borders is itself fraught with interpretative problems. Comparison is most 
often made between societies, which we tend to distinguish as distinct states and identify 
according to geographic borders. War, by its very nature, makes a mockery of such 
geographic borders. Firstly, if understood as a contest between states or distinct political 
communities, war frequently breaks down old territorial borders and throws up new ones in 
its wake. Secondly, military conquest of a territory does not usually constitute the simple 
expansion of the victorious society and the complete removal or eradication of the defeated 
(although such an eventuality has occurred in the past, especially in the ancient Near East); 
rather, the victorious society often subjugates and governs the new territory, leaving its pre-
existing social structure and culture largely intact. Over time, this results in a process of 
acculturation. In other words, an apparently rigid political-geographical border need not 
imply a rigid socio-cultural border. At borders between states or communities, especially 
those in flux, there are myriad ways in which social and cultural lines can become blurred. 
This blurring operates in times of peace as well as in times of war.22 
 
Purpose of the comparative method 
In adopting a comparative approach to war and ethics, four questions seem to stand out as 
particularly important: 
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1) When does ethical reflection on war first emerge? 
2) Why does ethical reflection on war emerge? 
3) Do different systems of ethics concerning war express distinct or similar ideas? 
4) How does ethical reflection on war influence the actual conduct of wars?23 
Underlying these questions is the assumption that societies were fighting wars for 
generations before any identifiable or coherent ‘ethics of war’ emerged. As Bernhard 
Williams posited, in the beginning was the deed, not the word or the belief.24 Similarly, Freud 
asserted that mankind’s speculative endeavours were only initiated as a result of experiencing 
the death of loved (yet hated) persons.25 It would also appear outlandish to claim that any 
system of military ethics – past or present (or future?) – is morally autonomous in the 
Kantian sense: i.e. sprung from universal duties rather than desires. Ethics of war service the 
needs of particular war societies and warriors, not the duties of a universal morality. This 
does not mean that such ethical systems are entirely permissive or are purely a veil for hard-
nosed realism. Over the course of history, societies and warriors have displayed a consistent 
desire to perceive themselves as ‘good’, ‘righteous’, and ‘just’; as a result, they are perfectly 
capable of imposing limits and penances on themselves in order to satisfy idealistic demands. 
After all, without some principle of justice or restraint to govern human relationships, it is 
difficult to imagine how any community could long survive, let alone prosper. Communities 
simply could not exist if a majority of individuals indulged in unrestrained violence; as St 
Augustine pointed out, there is honour even among thieves.  
Clearly, ancient communities flourished as a result of successfully developing ethical 
and behavioural norms designed to limit and regulate the internal use of violence in order to 
maintain the stability of the community. The earliest surviving legal codes seek to restrain 
and regulate intra-communal violence, while modern psychological research suggests that 
human beings possess an innate aversion to killing other members of their species.26 
However, communities also needed to reconcile these violence-limiting norms with the 
occasional (or perhaps frequent) requirement to employ extreme violence against competing 
communities. The quotidian aversion to violence within the community thus had to be 
replaced by an acceptance of large-scale violence for the extra-communal activity of war. 
This inversion of ethical and legal norms was necessary for the survival or expansion of a 
community; nevertheless, as an inversion of ‘normal’ morality and behaviour, it required 
explanation and legitimation. The fruit of this process of explanation and legitimation is what 
is referred to as the ethics of war.  
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Therefore the ethics of war emerged from the crucible of war and were shaped by its 
exigencies and realities. Societies and individuals frequently want to engage in war, and thus 
require ethical systems that permit them to pursue war whilst minimizing any risk to their 
self-image as ‘righteous’ and ‘good’ according to the definitions of their own community. 
Such systems can also serve the function of imposing restraints that allow for the possibility 
of a modus vivendi to be re-established with competitors (enemies) after the war is finished or 
encouraging conduct that provides a measure of security for all antagonists – enslavement or 
ransoming versus summary execution; the preservation of types of agricultural or sacred 
property, etc. – and might therefore be interpreted as a form of insurance policy. As such, 
restraint performs a pragmatic function despite being imagined through an idealistic lens, and 
further reinforces the warrior’s self-image as a righteous individual belonging to a righteous 
(ergo superior) society. 
 
Anthropological Approach 
I have discussed the basic premise of the comparative approach from a historical perspective. 
It is time to turn now to a consideration of how other disciplines can aid our investigation of 
war and ethics. The most significant contribution of anthropology is to our understanding of 
culture and its multi-layered complexities and meanings. War is an essentially communal, 
social, and cultural phenomenon; therefore, the scholar interested in war can benefit from 
anthropological insights. 
Anthropologists have typically been most interested in explaining the existence of war 
in societies and how it is fought. These observations are used as a means to better understand 
the human relations and layers of meaning that make up the culture as a whole. Even more 
fundamentally, war is seen ‘to play a central causal role in the general evolution of cultural 
systems’.27 Very roughly, we can divide anthropological thought on war into two camps: 
structuralists and superstructuralists. Structuralists emphasise material causes and factors, and 
leading lights of this approach (so-called structural functionalists such as Malinkowski and 
Radcliffe-Brown) have been hostile to historical perspectives.28 In reading 
structuralist/materialist analyses of war, there seems little to differentiate between 
materialism and political realism (or pragmatism). By citing material interests as the primary 
and sometimes sole cause of war, structuralists not only support the idea that all humans are 
essentially motivated by the same thing (wealth, power, prestige – or ‘ophelimities’ as 
Andreski terms them29), but also effectively reject the central importance of ethics, religion, 
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or any other ideational influence.30 How one explains wars such as the Crusades, then, 
becomes difficult, unless one is willing to fall back on now out-dated views that the crusades 
were simply about second-sons seeking their fortune. Equally, how might one explain the 
famous Melian resistance against Athens, when armed resistance was so obviously doomed 
to failure?31 Why do societies repeatedly limit their actions in war, if nothing drives them 
other than a desire for resources and power? One might turn to the ‘insurance policy’ 
explanation (that societies restrain themselves on the understanding that others will follow 
suit), but it seems that this explanation is having to do a lot of work to explain away the 
ethics of war entirely. A rigid structuralist approach also ignores the extensive 
anthropological work completed on taboo, which establishes that societies frequently 
understand war and killing (even if necessary to protect the community) as problematic.32 If 
killing in war was simply about resource/power acquisition or defence, it is difficult to 
explain the existence of widespread taboos on warriors who have successfully defended or 
acquired such resources/power. (And we should certainly think of the doctrine of penance in 
the medieval Christian world as a clear example of taboo.) Finally, ground-breaking recent 
work on the role of emotions and honour in international relations surely adds an important 
new dimension to any discussion of material versus non-material interests as causes of war.33 
This is not to say that structural conditions do not influence war: they are clearly 
crucial, and in many cases war can and should be seen as primarily a competition for 
resources or power. The structural, or infrastructural conditions will influence how a war is 
waged,34 and they will also influence the creation of ethics and laws pertaining to war, for the 
ethics of war must inevitably reflect the physical practice of war, at least to some extent. For 
example, a pastoralist society is unlikely to develop norms protecting crops or fruit trees 
during wartime, whereas an agriculturalist society is more likely to do so (e.g. Deuteronomy 
20). 
Superstructuralists, by contrast, emphasise the role of culture in determining why and 
how societies fight, with many arguing that war is a cultural invention, governed by social 
customs and conventions. This superstructural approach has generally been more receptive to 
historical perspectives.35 An extreme, albeit now virtually abandoned, emphasis on the 
fundamental role of culture in the origin and development of warfare was evident in so-called 
‘diffusionist theory’, with some scholars going so far as to pinpoint the actual invention of 
war in predynastic Egypt (early third millennium BCE), from whence it was exported to other 
world cultures.36  
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A modified version of the superstructural approach was pioneered by Clifford Geertz, 
who encourages us to look at culture as a web of symbols, each with its own distinct but 
interdependent meaning: 
 
The concept of culture I espouse…is essentially a semiotic one. Believing, with Max 
Weber, that man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun, I 
take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental 
science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning. It is explication I 
am after, construing social expression on their surface enigmatical.37 
 
Geertz’s interest in the meaning and social import behind structures of signification is 
particularly apposite to questions of war, violence, and ethics. This is because war involves 
actions that are usually prohibited within the domestic sphere and yet, through a process of 
ethical reasoning, are made acceptable. In most pre-modern societies, if a person ran a sword 
through someone else in the course of normal daily life then it would be accepted that that 
person had committed a crime; as a result, the actor would likely face severe punishment or 
risk initiating a blood feud. However, if that same actor ran a sword through a member of a 
rival community during ‘war time’, not only would that person be excused from punishment 
(although not necessarily taboo/penance), but s/he would even be lauded and rewarded for 
the killing. What accounts for the different consequences? It is that the actions, though 
physically identical, have different meanings and significance. Only by understanding the 
nuances of the structures of signification within the prevailing culture can we begin to 
interpret these meanings and thus gain a better understanding of how any specific society 
distinguishes illicit murder from licit killing. 
In terms of methodology, how are we, as historians, to proceed? Anthropological 
methodology is most renowned for deep field research, with the anthropologist embedding 
him/herself in a society and observing the minutiae of everyday life, which hopefully enables 
a thick description of a society’s behaviours and their context. Clearly, such fieldwork is not 
possible for historians of pre-modern societies, and we must instead rely on textual or 
material artefacts. Nevertheless, there is much to be learned from the anthropological 
approach and its interest in minutiae and meaning. Historians are very often likes magpies, 
drawn to the shiniest evidence, whether literary or archaeological. But this can distort the 
image of a historical society. By their very nature, shiny things are unusual and special, they 
are rarely representative of the typical and quotidian. Through utilizing as wide a range of 
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evidence as possible and paying attention to historical minutiae – those dull or fragmentary 
texts, those cracked or lacklustre pottery shards – the historian will be better able to 
reconstruct a historical culture in the round and get closer to the webs of significance 
suggested by Geertz, whilst also conceding that such webs will always remain fundamentally 
elusive to the scholar.38 Carlo Ginzburg spoke of something similar when he proposed that 
historians should follow the method of Giovanni Morelli, Sherlock Holmes, and Sigmund 
Freud, tracking down tiny details or ‘spie’ (clues) in order to reveal ‘a deeper reality’.39 Of 
course, the twentieth-century turn to social and cultural history, away from the history of 
‘great men’, has already contributed to this more holistic approach to the past. The same 
trend is also evident within intellectual history, with the ‘linguistic turn’ of the Cambridge 
School championing a methodological approach prioritising the recreation of a detailed 
linguistic context for works of political thought.40 
There is an important caveat to be made. The anthropological approach must 
distinguish between culture as a reality and culture as a subject of analysis. As Geertz says, 
descriptions of particular cultures are ‘constructions we imagine…[people] to place upon 
what they live through, the formulae they use to define what happens to them. What it does 
not mean is that such descriptions are themselves…part of the reality they are ostensibly 
describing.’41 This is even more obvious when analysing the historical past. The very process 
of attempting to reconstruct ethical systems of thought about war undoubtedly produces 
distortions and divergences from historical ‘reality’. What I mean by this is that my 
articulation of an ethical system of thought requires a significant degree of organization, 
explanation, and coherency in order to make it intelligible to the reader. But this level of 
coherency likely goes beyond the articulation of the customs and norms of the particular 
society under examination. Most social conventions are based on cultural assumptions and 
adopted behaviours; in other words, people may not have thought about such things very 
much, all the while having their actions shaped by them. To refer to an ancient Egyptian or 
ancient Greek ‘ethics of war’, therefore, may be somewhat artificial, in that it infers a formal, 
monolithic system. The reality was probably something more nebulous and pliable. 
Examining military and political history is perhaps the best way to infer whether these ethical 
systems found some sort of coherent and concrete expression. On the other hand, the 
realisation that culture is itself rarely free from contradictions – something highlighted by 
anthropology42 – is a crucial step in better understanding the complex relationship between 
the ethics of war and the conduct of war. Military conduct frequently contravenes ethical or 
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legal norms, but this does not necessarily mean that such norms or laws are defunct, or that 
people do not hold them dear. 
Indeed, one further facet of Geertz’s approach to culture can highlight the value of 
investigating the ethics of war rather than the strategic, tactical, or technological aspects of 
military history. Geertz proposes ‘that culture is best seen not as complexes of concrete 
behavior patterns – customs, usages, traditions, habit clusters – …but as a set of control 
mechanisms – plans, recipes, rules, instructions (what computer engineers call “programs”) – 
for the governing of behavior…man is precisely the animal most desperately dependent upon 
such extragenetic, outside-the-skin control mechanisms, such cultural programs, for ordering 
his behavior.’43 Viewed from this angle, ethics of war – as sets of rules and instructions, or 
control mechanisms – are more fundamental to understanding war in any particular society 
than the ‘concrete behaviour patterns’ of waging war itself. 
 
Sociological Approach 
War is a social phenomenon, and the ethics of war are a product of collective thought. More 
than any other discipline, sociology has thought systematically about the nature of social 
relations, groups, and institutions. In their approach to war, most sociologists treat it as 
directly comparable with other types of conflict, whether within the family or between socio-
economic classes. As a product of social factors, they eschew the socio-biological ideas 
espoused by some anthropologists, which attempt to ground war in human biology, instincts, 
and ‘nature’. According to Hans Speier, the specific character of war ‘is dependent upon the 
specific organization of society and times of peace…any aspect of war is fully intelligible 
only when it is seen in relation to the given organization of those societies, their technologies 
and their institutions, their material resources and their morals.’44 Indeed, sociologists often 
credit war with strengthening the bond between members of a group, therefore see its 
development as a social response to perpetuate communal life.45 For those interested in the 
ethics of war this has real relevance, because it posits that the physical characteristics of war 
are forged by social forces that include social morals, and that such forces have a 
determinative or constitutive quality in how wars are prosecuted. This stands in stark contrast 
to Clausewitz’s claim that, when defining war, the existence of ‘certain self-imposed’ ethical 
restraints in the form of international law and custom are ‘hardly worth mentioning’ and ‘lead 
to logical absurdity’.46 
Of further pertinence to the relationship between ethics and war is Émile Durkheim’s 
insistence that social facts are ‘real’ and should be considered as ‘things’. As Durkheim 
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(1982: 43, 59) describes, ‘We represent them [social facts] as consisting of manners of acting 
or thinking, distinguishable through their special characteristic of being capable of exercising 
a coercive influence on the consciousness of individuals.’47 Social phenomena are, therefore, 
external to individuals and are generated only through the interactions of a combination of 
individuals – a society – rather than from a single individual alone: 
 
this synthesis sui generis, which constitutes every society, gives rise to new 
phenomena, different from those which occur in consciousnesses in isolation…these 
specific facts reside in the society itself that produces them and not in its parts – namely 
its members. In this sense therefore they lie outside the consciousness of individuals as 
such, in the same way as the distinctive features of life lie outside the chemical 
substances that make up living organism.48 
 
Evidence for this psychological distinction between groups and individuals could be found in 
the fact that the mentality of groups is not the same as individuals and therefore collective 
consciousness was subject to different laws than individual consciousness. This collective 
consciousness inevitably produced new social facts, which Durkheim termed ‘institutions’.49 
According to this reasoning we should consider war – as a social enterprise – as 
reflective not of individual but collective consciousness. More than that, war itself becomes 
an institution, with an existence independent of the individuals who partake in it. The 
morality or ethics of war, consequently, must also be a product of the group rather than the 
individual, and as such, we should expect that the ethics of war favour the interests of the 
group over the interests of the individual. How might this affect their content and direction? 
Might the collective conscience that produces the ethics of war countenance action at which 
the individual conscience might baulk? We might find this rather worrying, as Durkheim was 
sure that individuals were subjected to social facts/institutions ‘without being able to modify 
them’.50 
One consequence of this insistence that social facts are ‘things’ was Durkheim’s faith 
in positivism and his belief that the scholar could observe social facts free from influences of 
his/her own circumstances.51 Given Durkheim’s faith in the objectivity of positivism, he was 
also willing to assess different systems of ethics as normal or pathological ‘on the basis of 
empirical examinations of the appropriateness of the rule to its social context’.52 This would 
imply that not only can we accurately reconstruct ancient and medieval systems of ethics, but 
that we can even judge them to be ‘normal’ and ‘pathological’, or ‘good’ or ‘bad’. But can 
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we really claim that certain rules, limitations, or justifications of war become ‘pathological’ 
or ‘bad’ when they no longer reflect the dominant social conditions? By contrast, Max Weber 
warned that empirical science should not confuse is with ought, thus necessitating a rejection 
of Durkheim’s confidence of engaging in normative judgements.53 
Another response to Durkheim’s positivism is the argument that by identifying 
‘systems’ or ‘traditions’ or ‘schools’ of thought (ethical or otherwise), we are in fact creating 
something like an ideal type: an instrument of analysis and interpretation and nothing more. 
As Terry Nardin argues, a tradition or system of thought ‘is not a “thing,” an ontologically 
given object of perception, a natural kind. The idea that there is a fixed and objective roster of 
ethical viewpoints waiting be correctly identified is absurd.’54 Weber, of course, coined the 
term ‘ideal type’ and did much to promote its use an analytical tool.55 The historian of the 
ethics of war can greatly benefit from this tool. Three conceptual categories are particularly 
invaluable in crafting an intelligible analysis of thought on war in different societies. These 
‘ideal types’ are: 1) just cause; 2) proper authority; 3) correct intention. Added to these are 
the broader categories of ius ad bellum and ius in bello. These categories are basically a 
product of the Romano-Christian just war tradition, the first two being discussed by Cicero 
and other pre-Christian writers, the third being introduced by Christian thinkers such as St 
Ambrose of Milan and St Augustine of Hippo. However, it wasn’t really until the twelfth 
century that the three categories were systematically delineated.56 To apply these categories 
to ancient Near Eastern ethical and legal thought is therefore patently anachronistic and 
requires a level of abstraction. Nonetheless, treated as ‘ideal types’, and used as an organizing 
analytical instrument, these categories are extremely useful. For, while Egyptians or Hittites 
never possessed the technical language of ‘just cause’ or ‘proper authority’, they undoubtedly 
possessed ideas analogous to these concepts. Furthermore, their ideas bear direct comparison 
to later just war theories, where the language of cause, authority, and intention is explicitly 
articulated.57 This is why, as ideal types, these categories can be used to organise and then 
compare cultures of war separated not only by language, but by significant expanses of time 
and space. After all, as Quincy Wright noted in his magisterial interdisciplinary study of war, 
‘Fictions, while necessary in the natural sciences, are the essence of the social sciences. The 
social scientist must create a structure of assumptions and use a language which is at the 
same time symbolic and emotive.’58 
 
Psychological Approach 
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Finally, I would like to consider the benefits of psychological analysis to the historical study 
of war and ethics. In many ways, integrating a psychological approach poses the greatest 
challenge to the historian, for few would dare to claim that we can accurately comprehend the 
psychology of historical actors merely through the words or objects they have left behind. 
Historical sources are, at best, deliberate constructions that present a one-sided record or 
interpretation of events; at worst, they are deliberate attempts to mislead and invent an 
alternative history that in no way reflects historical reality. 
Nonetheless, since the time of Homer, writers of war have been interested in the 
psychology of warriors.59 Indeed, Simone Weil famously argued for the importance of force 
and power as fundamental drivers of human psychology that underlie the themes of the 
Iliad.60 Freudian psychoanalysis has also been interested in the relationship between the 
destructive and sociable impulses in human psychology, and the affect this has on internal 
and external social relations. Like anthropological superstructuralists and most sociologists, 
psychologists tend to view war as essentially controlled by social customs and institutions.61 
However, this is not to say that war is not also rooted in deep psychological impulses, 
neuroses and desires. At least one psychoanalytical approach seeks to root war largely in 
individual psychology rather than ‘social facts’ or materialism.62 This approach claims that 
‘war represents a social institution the aim of which is to cure the paranoid depressive 
anxieties existing (in no more or less marked degree and more or less resolved in terms of 
integration with reality) in every man’.63 War transforms a psychologically internal enemy – 
the “Terrifier” – into ‘an external, flesh-and-blood adversary who can be faced and killed’.64 
As such, war helps individuals maintain psychological equilibrium. Fornari goes as far to 
suggest that: 
 
war could be seen as an attempt at therapy, carried out by a social institution which, 
precisely by institutionalizing war, increases to gigantic proportions what is initially an 
elementary defensive mechanism of the ego in the schizo-paranoid phase.…The most 
enigmatic aspect of this system would seem to be its desire to control the uncontrollable 
by translating internal psychotic anxieties into real external dangers.65 
 
If war functions to enhance both internal psychological and external physical security, then 
this may explain why war has been so prevalent. While the proposition that war is a form of 
therapy might sound a little outlandish, the theory that war was an outlet for repressed 
impulses was proposed by Freud many years earlier. If true, this would seem to suggest that 
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war is essentially unrestrainable (itself being a product of unrestrained impulses), and 
therefore normative claims associated with the ius in bello tradition are merely illusory – as 
Clausewitz maintained. 
Pursuing a slightly different tack, others have sought to explain the near universalism 
of war – regardless of different social contexts – in the fact that war ‘promises to fulfil some 
need or combination of needs that are at least close to universal….We are dealing here with 
what is clearly a fundamental human tension’.66 This tension is the specifically human 
experience of asserting individualism at the same time as attempting to integrate as a member 
of a group. War has been the most common method of alleviating this tension, although 
mysticism is an alternative.67 Promising to enhance individual prowess while at the same 
time deeply integrating the individual into a cohort united by shared (traumatic) experiences, 
war is potentially very attractive; however, for many, this attraction is difficult to admit.68 
Building on LeShan’s hypothesis, I would speculate that the ethics of war help to persuade us 
that the things which we guiltily desire (war and violence, and the potential profits associated 
with them) are not really so bad; indeed, these guilty desires can be made into something 
positive. Everyone would like to be told that their bad habits are virtuous. The truth, after all, 
is that communities and states cannot go to war without the participation of individuals, while 
an individual cannot make war without a larger community or state. We cannot place guilt or 
blame solely on the shoulders of the community or on the shoulders of the individual when 
both are complicit in war-making.69 It is to this truth that Henry V speaks in Shakespeare’s 
play when, disguised before the battle of Agincourt, he argues with his soldiers that ‘Every 
subject’s duty is the King’s, but every subject’s soul is his own’.70 
Freud’s thought on war very much focused on this relationship between the 
state/society and the individual. Freud suggested that society seeks to curb the basic impulses 
of violence possessed by all individuals, through enforcing social customs, mores, and 
morality. The motivation for doing so, however, is not to eliminate violence per se, but rather 
to monopolize its use to the state.71 Responding to the horrors of World War 1, Freud 
declared: ‘A belligerent state permits itself every such misdeed, every such act of violence, as 
would disgrace the individual.’72 The danger of war is that, through encouraging its citizens 
to indulge in violence that is usually denied to them in normal society and morality, the state 
actually destroys the dams constructed by social influences during a person’s lifetime, dams 
that are intended to curb individual violent impulses. The result is a flood of unrestrained 
violence that strikes normal society as immoral and atrocious: 
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Nor should it be a matter for surprise that this relaxation of all the moral ties between 
the collective individuals of mankind should have had repercussions on the morality of 
individuals; for our conscience is not the inflexible judge that ethical teachers declare it, 
but in its origin is “social anxiety” and nothing else. When the community no longer 
raises objections, there is an end, too, to the suppression of evil passions, and men 
perpetrate deeds of cruelty, fraud, treachery and barbarity so incompatible with their 
level of civilization that one would have thought them impossible.73 
 
As the psychoanalyst Robert Laing might put it, war is an assault on the established routines, 
norms, and expectations that together create an individual’s ‘ontological security’: that is, the 
secure identity of the ‘self’, which empowers individual agents with personal agency. As 
Anthony Giddens has shown, this sense of the ‘self’ can equally be applied to societies and 
states.74 War so blatantly violates everyday norms and routines that it threatens to undermine 
the self-image of the individual or society, creating ‘ontological insecurity’. War breaches the 
psychological dams, so to speak, which social individuals have spent a lifetime building in 
order to control the waters of their violent proclivities. Arguably, the ethics of war are an 
attempt to patch breaches in these dams (caused by war itself) by claiming that war is still 
governed by morality and rules that are derived from everyday morality and routines, albeit 
adjusted according to the unique realities of war. Ethics of war tell us that justice, 
righteousness, piety, and so on, are all to be found in war, as in peace. For the warrior, this 
provides some measure of ontological security and makes a return to society, after war, 
possible. 
Indeed, the declaration of war arguably entails a psychological reordering of sorts, 
inaugurating a ‘new psychological world established by war’.75 Rituals governing the 
declaration of war, such as the Roman practice of hurling a javelin into enemy territory (later 
symbolically represented in the Forum), inform the warrior that normal morality has ceased 
and a temporary morality – which permits homicide, pillage, arson, rape, and enslavement –
has been instituted. During war itself, the ethics of war perform a critical function for the 
individual combatant, assuaging the guilt associated with warlike actions and the inversion of 
normal morality. They are also useful to combatants who, embedded in theologies that teach 
that one’s experience of the afterlife is dependent upon one’s virtuous actions in life, may be 
anxious by the increased chance of death brought about by war itself. Moreover, with 
traditions of war often stressing the self-sacrifice of the warrior, individuals could assuage 
their guilt by justifying it on the basis of defending loved persons and homeland, perhaps 
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even appealing to masochistic psychological impulses. We are quick to disparage the 
sacrifices of others for values we perceive as worthless as the actions of the masochist or the 
sadist, whereas extreme sacrifices for values that we ourselves approve of are interpreted as 
acts of heroism or sanctity.76 Indeed, if the ethics of war genuinely puts combatants of one 
side at a disadvantage (through limiting their violence), this too could be interpreted as 
evidence of a masochistic streak within a certain society, perhaps assuaging a deeply felt guilt 
at engaging in war in the first place. 
The problem, argues Freud, is that the moral rules of society, which constrain natural 
impulses, force individuals to act psychologically beyond their means.77 Society produces 
cultural hypocrites. It is not surprising that in extreme circumstances such as war the removal 
of the strict social rules produces a range of actions that most people would deem horrific and 
immoral.78 Put simply, war destroys cultural instinct training.79 The ethics of war, therefore, 
can be seen as an attempt to keep the damage to a minimum. 
 
Conclusions 
Much more could be said about the methodologies of the aforementioned social sciences, not 
to mention disciplines such as analytical philosophy, theology, art history, geography, 
International Relations, and others which have not been discussed. I have simply suggested 
some avenues for thought, although I am painfully aware that I have been far from 
comprehensive and have indulged in a good deal of speculation. 
The issue I have not addressed, but arguably should have made a priority, is why we 
should study war or the ethics of war in the first place. 
Scott Davis claims that the ‘ways in which peoples have justified and constrained the 
use of…force are windows into how they see themselves and the other peoples with whom 
they share, often reluctantly, the world around them.’80 The reason why war and the ethics of 
war are especially revealing about the character of certain societies is because it is only in 
times of uncertainty, anxiety, and change that people really question the relationship between 
their beliefs and values, on the one hand, and their actions, on the other.81 The study of war 
and the ethics of war encompasses the entire gamut of human experience: individual and 
group psychology, religious belief, art and technology, philosophical enquiry, jurisprudence, 
the role of institutions, economic costs and benefits, international politics, life and death. I 
would suggest that we learn more about a society from its justification and practice of war 
than from any other aspect of its history, for the very reason that war and the ethics of war are 
informed by, and also inform, so many other social practices and beliefs. Furthermore, one 
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can argue that it is only in the extreme that one sees the true character of a society. Under 
stress and existential threat, what are the values that a society clings to, and what is jettisoned 
as superfluous? These are fundamental questions and may provide fundamental insights. It is 
only by learning from the many discoveries of other disciplines that we can begin to ask the 
right questions of our material, and hopefully provide some compelling answers. 
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